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This paper presents empirical evidence on the determinants of industry-level multifactor productivity growth. 
We focus on “traditional factors”, including the process of technological catch up, human capital and R&D as 
well as institutional factors affecting labor adjustment costs. The analysis is based on harmonized data for 17 
manufacturing industries in 18 OECD economies over the past two decades. The disaggregated analysis 
reveals that the process of technological convergence takes place mainly in low-tech industries, while in high-
tech industries, country leaders tend to pull ahead of the others. The link between R&D activity and 
productivity also depends on technological characteristics of the industries: while there is no evidence of R&D 
boosting productivity in low-tech industries, the effect is strong in high-tech industries, but the technology 
leaders tend to enjoy higher returns on R&D expenditure compared with followers. There is also evidence in 
the data that high labor adjustment costs (proxied by the strictness of employment protection legislation) can 
have a strong negative impact on productivity.  In particular, when institutional settings do not allow wages or 
internal training to offset high hiring and firing costs, the latter reduce incentives for innovation and adoption 
of new technologies, and lead to lower productivity performance.  Albeit drawn from the experience of 
industrial countries, this result may have relevant implications for many developing economies characterized 
by low relative wage flexibility and high labor adjustment costs.     
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Recent growth trends in OECD economies have renewed interest by policy makers and analysts on 
the sources of economic growth. Some countries, including the United States, have been able to 
revert the long-standing slowdown in multifactor productivity  growth –  the standard proxy for 
technological  progress -- while  others (mainly in Continental Europe) have persisted along a 
declining productivity growth path, or have even experienced a protracted stagnation in output 
growth (as in Japan). These striking differences in growth patterns have been related to the different 
ability of countries to innovate in the high-tech sector (e.g. information and communication 
technology, ICT) and to adopt new and highly-productive equipment. Can cross-country differences 
in innovation and adoption of high-tech be explained by greater returns to such activities in certain 
countries? And, are there appropriate business climate conditions that provide stronger incentives for 
firms to innovate and adopt new technologies? If this is indeed the case, is there a role for policy 
makers for improving business climate conditions? To date, the empirical evidence on these issues is 
scant. 
Much of the recent growth literature has either used accounting techniques to decompose aggregate 
GDP and productivity growth into their main driving forces (see e.g. Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2001; 
Olinel and Sichel, 2001), or regression techniques to assess the long-run process of cross-country 
economic convergence (see e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). The latter 
strand of literature has also been extended to consider differences in technology growth rates across 
industries and countries (see e.g. Bernard and Jones, 1996a,b; Harrigan, 1997a,b). These studies 
largely concentrate on the “traditional” determinants of growth, i.e. the accumulation of reproducible 
factor inputs with the possible inclusion of human and knowledge capital. At the same time, however, 
sector and micro-level studies have pointed to the importance of market conditions for firms’ 
decision to innovate and adopt new technologies (Caves et al., 1998; McKinsey Global Institute, 
1997; Baily and Gerbach, 1995; Nickell, 1996; Blanchflower and Machin, 1996; Disney et al., 2000). 
These studies offer important insights on the behavior of individual firms and specific markets, but 
because of their micro-oriented nature do not easily allow assessment of the importance of 
institutions and policy across countries. 
This paper offers a contribution to the debate about the role of policy and institutions for productivity 
and output growth along two dimensions. First, we use harmonized two-digit industry-level data for a 
set of industrial economies to shed light on productivity convergence across countries and on the role 
of investment in human and knowledge capital. Our model allows for different patterns of 
cross-country convergence in multifactor productivity in different industries, while testing for the 
importance of human capital and R&D in fostering productivity, either directly or indirectly, via the 
process of technology adoption. We also consider the possibility that the impact of technological 
catch-up, as well as of human capital and R&D, may differ depending on the underlying technology 
characteristics of each industry. Second, we assess the role of labor adjustment costs and bargaining 
regimes for productivity growth.  In particular, we focus on hiring and firing costs that, by raising 
labor adjustment costs, may curb incentives to foster internal efficiency through the adoption of 
leading technologies and innovation (see e.g., Audretsch and Thurik, 2001; Hobjin and Jovanovic,   3
2001). Likewise, we look at different wage bargaining systems that, by shifting part of the innovation 
rents to workers, may reduce the expected returns of innovative activity (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). 
Our working hypothesis is that these factors may be of particular importance in a period characterized 
by the rapid diffusion of a new technology (ICT), which requires significant organizational and skill 
changes (see e.g. Baily, 2002 and Bresnahan et al. 2002).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the main features of recent growth trends in 
OECD countries. In Section 2, we present our productivity model and highlight the potential role of 
innovation (proxied by R&D), human capital and labor market regulations and institutions for 
industry productivity growth. The dataset used in our empirical analysis -- 17  manufacturing 
industries in 18 OECD countries over the 1984-1998 period -- is presented in Section 3, while our 
empirical results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, we draw some concluding remarks in Section 5. 
1.  Recent growth trends 
Output, productivity and employment patterns 
Much of the discussion about economic growth in recent years has been motivated by a widespread 
perception that some countries, most notably the United States, have experienced an acceleration in 
growth patterns while others, mainly in Continental Europe and Japan, have shown a sluggish 
growth. This perception is largely confirmed by a simple comparison of average growth rates over 
the past decade (Table 1). Here we use cyclically-adjusted series to control for differences in business 
cycle conditions across countries.
1 For the OECD area as a whole, trend GDP per capita growth rates 
slowed down in the 1990s as compared to the previous decade. However, there has been a fairly 
widespread pick up in growth in the second half of the decade in most countries. This aggregate 
pattern, however, hides marked differences across regions and individual countries: while GDP 
growth has accelerated in the United States and Canada, it has slowed down in EU15. The latter 
pattern is largely due to the poor growth performance of most large EU economies, while some 
(mainly small) countries have shown clear signs of acceleration in growth. 
The table also shows how these different growth patterns have come about. In particular, the first 
three columns shows how GDP growth in the business sector
2 can be decomposed into growth in 
total hours worked and growth in hourly productivity, while the remaining two columns shows the 
driving forces of hourly productivity, namely changes in capital/labor ratio and multifactor 
productivity (MFP) growth. Labor productivity growth accounts for at least half of GDP growth in 
most OECD countries and considerably more than that in many of them. Notwithstanding differences 
                                                      
1 .  Indeed, over the 1990s business cycles were largely a-synchronized across OECD countries and this may lead 
to inaccurate cross-country comparisons. In most of this section, we use cyclically-adjusted series obtained by 
applying an extended version of the Hodrick-Prescott filter where the well-known end-of-sample problem is 
minimized by prolonging the time series out of sample using the average growth rates observed over the entire 
decade. See Scarpetta et al., (2000) for more details. 
2 .  The business sector is defined as the total economy minus Community, Social and Personal Services.    4
in labor productivity growth rates across countries, it is noticeable that the overall dispersion (last two 
rows in the Table) did not change in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s, despite the significant 
widening of GDP growth rates. A key factor to reconcile growing disparities in GDP per capita 
growth rates in a context of broadly stable differences in labor productivity growth is a divergence in 
employment and hours patterns. Significant increases in total hours worked in Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, the United States and Australia contrast sharply with slumps in Japan, and a 
number of European countries. 
The table also suggests significant differences in the drivers of labor productivity. In most European 
countries, high (or even rising) productivity growth rates have been achieved by a marked process of 
capital deepening, which, given the poor employment performance, was largely due to substitution of 
labor with capital rather than to strong investment in physical capital (see also Scarpetta et al. 2000 
for more details). In contrast, labor productivity has been driven by a combination of capital 
deepening and growth in MFP (i.e. a proxy for technical progress) in Australia, Ireland, Canada, 
Norway, New Zealand and the United States. As shown in the table, these are the countries where 
most of the drivers of growth have improved leading to acceleration in overall GDP growth. 
The group of countries that have enjoyed better economic performance -- through a combination of 
higher employment, investment and acceleration in  MFP -- include  all  of those that have 
implemented significant structural reforms over the past decade (e.g. Australia, Ireland, New 
Zealand) or where underlying market conditions have always been favorable (e.g. United States).
3 By 
contrast, growth performance has been lower in a number of (European) countries where structural 
reforms have lagged behind. This preliminary evidence is appealing and seems to support our interest 
for looking at the structural factors influencing market behavior.  
Productivity growth has also differed significantly across manufacturing industries within each 
country (Chart 1). In the United States and Japan, productivity growth was primarily driven by 
high-tech industries in the 1990s. By contrast, in most European countries, industries adopting low or 
intermediate technologies played a more important role in aggregate manufacturing productivity 
growth. Differences in industry-specific conditions across countries, as well as regulations and 
institutions affecting firms’ behavior are likely to underlie some of the cross-country variance in 
these industry productivity growth rates and in the technological specialization of countries. In the 
next section we focus on the possible role of regulations and institutions in the labor market as a 
possible factor driving productivity via its impact on the incentives to innovate and adopt leading 
technologies.  
2.  The links between regulations and institutions on the labor market and productivity: 
some theoretical considerations 
What is the role of labor market regulations and institutions in the process of technological adoption 
and innovation? It should be stressed at the outset that these regulations and institutions are primarily 
                                                      
3 .  For more details on recent reforms in labor and product markets see OECD (1999).    5
designed to ensure socially desirable outcomes rather than promote productivity growth. But by 
raising labor costs and the costs of workforce adjustment, they may also reduce incentives for firms 
to expand and innovate as well as hire more workers with negative economic and social effects.  
Traditional growth models tend to suggest that, to the extent that labor market rigidities reduce the 
equilibrium level of employment, they also negatively affect economic growth. This is because, 
ceteris paribus, a lower level of employment reduces the marginal product of capital and the 
incentives to save and invest.
4  Likewise, regulations that raise the cost of adjusting factor inputs, 
including labor, are likely to reduce the expected returns on innovation or investment aimed at 
adopting new technologies with detrimental effects on long-term growth.   
Three main aspects of labor market policy and institutional settings seem to be more closely related 
to the incentive for firms to expand and innovate, although the links are often complex: i) the system 
of industrial relations; ii) the costs of hiring and firing (proxied by the stringency of Employment 
Protection Legislation, EPL); and iii) the possible interactions between industry-specific 
characteristics of the technology and EPL, which lead to different human resource strategies. 
It can be argued that bargaining regimes affect both the size of innovation and technology adoption 
rents, through their impact on the cost of pursuing these activities, and the scope for the firm to 
appropriate these rents rather than sharing them with workers or other firms (see notably Boyer, 
1988, and Hall and Soskice, 2001). In decentralized wage-bargaining regimes, incentives to innovate 
and adopt new technologies depend crucially on workers' bargaining power. The risk of hold-up can 
be partly mitigated when bargaining occurs at the national level (or at the industry level but with 
economy-wide co-ordination) and sets the general frame of the wage schedule. In such a case, the 
reservation wage is fixed for all lower-level bargaining units and is adjusted mainly in response to 
aggregate shocks. As a consequence, the firm’s incentive to undertake innovative investment no 
longer depends on the bargaining power of its own workers (Teulings and Hartog, 1998). 
Hiring and firing restrictions may raise the cost of labor adjustment, which is often needed after 
innovations have been introduced (see e.g. Cappelli, 2000). The effects of these restrictions on 
productivity and innovation are, however, likely to be mediated by industrial relation regimes. 
Broadly speaking, in countries where wage negotiations are decentralized, firms tend to adjust their 
workforce while innovating by hiring adequately skilled workers on the labor market. Conversely, in 
centralized or sectoral wage bargaining systems, wages are more compressed and firms, despite 
finding more difficult to attract high skilled workers on the external market, gain from training their 
own workers (as there is a greater wedge between productivity and wages at high skill levels).
5 In 
addition, countries with centralized or sectoral wage bargaining systems also tend to have 
                                                      
4    This standard view is, however, challenges by some endogenous growth models. For example, Bean and 
Pissarides (1993) show that in an overlapping generations model, an increase in the bargaining power of 
workers may boost growth: if youths are assumed to work and save and older people to consume and reap the 
returns from capital, then a shift in bargaining power towards labor may well increase savings, investment and 
ultimately long-term growth. 
5 .  Lynch (1994), Blinder and Krueger (1996) and Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) offer some evidence of more 
firm-sponsored training in more coordinated countries.   6
comparatively high hiring and firing costs. The combination of wage compression and high labor 
adjustment costs tend to favor a process of competence accumulation based on firm-supported 
training and on-the-job learning.  
Wage compression may not, however, be a sufficient condition for firms to rely on the internal labor 
market to adapt their work force and, ultimately, for the decision to innovate and/or adopt a new 
technology. Another feature of industrial relation system plays a crucial role: the degree of 
co-ordination among employers.
6 Coordination is implicit in highly centralized wage setting systems 
but also exists in some countries with predominantly sectoral bargaining systems. In coordinated 
countries, there is only a limited variability of wage offers across firms, thereby reducing the scope 
for poaching (Teulings and Hartog, 1998; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999a). Likewise, co-ordination 
often leads to close inter-firm practices where poaching is considered as unfair behavior (see Blinder 
and Krueger, 1996; Casper et al., 1999).  
The potential effects of bargaining regimes and EPL on the incentives to innovate and adopt new 
technologies may also depend on the technological characteristics of the sector in which firms 
operate. It can be argued that in low-tech industries high firing cots are likely to lead to higher 
adjustment costs, with possible negative effects on innovation and adoption. In high-tech industries 
the effects of EPL may depend on the technological trajectory of the sector. For example, Saint-Paul 
(2002) suggests that a high firing cost economy may tend to specialize in “secondary 
innovation” -- i.e. innovation that increases efficiency in the production of existing goods, as opposed 
to “primary innovation” that leads to new goods. More generally, when technological progress is 
cumulative (i.e. further innovations along the same trajectory), then investing in the internal labor 
force may be an effective way to overcome high firing costs. This is not the case if technological 
progress leads to frequent shifts in the type of physical and human capital required in the production 
process. In this latter case, firms have to rely on the external labor market which may be costly when 
EPL is very strict.
7 
All in all, there are a number of theoretical links between  labor market institutions and innovation, 
adoption of new technologies and, ultimately, productivity performance. Chart 2 offers an illustration 
of the possible links between industrial relations regimes and EPL on the one hand and productivity 
performances on the other hand. Industrial relations regimes are identified by a summary indicator of 
corporatism, which combines two aspects: i) the level of bargaining: centralized, intermediate (at 
sector or regional), or decentralized (firm level); and ii) the degree of coordination among employers’ 
                                                      
6.  An industrial relations system can be said to be coordinated when: i) the wage-bargain occurs in a centralized 
way or co-ordination among employers and/or trade unions sets a uniform band of wages; ii) employers and 
trade unions co-operate as regard to decision-making inside the firm; and iii) business associations have an 
active role in solving free-riding problems across firms (Carlin and Soskice, 1990).  
7  .  Empirical evidence indeed suggests countries with coordinated industrial relations systems and relatively 
stringent employment protection (e.g. Germany, Austria) have stronger technological comparative advantage in 
industries characterized by cumulative technological progress than countries with decentralized wage 
bargaining, no co-ordination and low EPL (e.g. United States, but also United Kingdom and New Zealand 
more recently) (see Bassanini and Ernst, 2002).   7
associations. As discussed above, this combined variable allows consideration of cases where 
cooperation between employers in an industry bargaining setting (e.g., Germany and Austria and, 
more recently, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands with the income policy agreements) may be an 
alternative, or functionally equivalent, to centralized systems, thereby mimicking their outcomes.
8  
Bearing in mind the very tentative nature of these bivariate correlations, Panel A suggests no 
apparent relationship between the degree of corporatism and the acceleration in MFP growth. By 
contrast, Panel B suggests a negative relationship between labor adjustment costs and MFP 
acceleration. Obviously, these correlations do not take into account the complex interactions between 
different institutional and technological factors shaping productivity developments. Thus, in the next 
section of the paper, we further assess these possible links estimating productivity equations across a 
set of industries in the OECD countries over the past two decades.  
3.  The MFP model 
Our empirical model starts with a standard production function (in country i and sector j), under 
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. This can be formalized as follows: 
 
( ) ijt ijt ij ijt ijt K L F A Y , ⋅ =                       [ 1 ]  
where Y is output, Fij(·) is a country/sector-specific production function assumed to be homogeneous 
of degree one and exhibits decreasing returns to the accumulation of each factor of production; and 
Aijt is a Hicks-neutral parameter of technological efficiency or multifactor productivity (MFP),
9 K is 
physical capital and L  is labor. Assuming a translog production function and taking logs yield: 
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In order to assess the driving forces of MFP growth, we extend the conventional endogenous growth 
model — in which technological efficiency is generally expressed as a function of knowledge and a 
residual set of influences (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) -- by assuming that, within each industry, the 
level of efficiency depends on country and industry characteristics as well as technological and 
organizational transfer from the technology-leader country (i = L) (e.g. Bernard & Jones, 1996a, 
1996b; Griffith et al. 2000; Harrigan, 1999; Dollar and Wolff, 1994). In this context, technological 
efficiency for a given industry j of country i at date t (aijt) can be modeled as an auto-regressive 
distributed lag ADL(1,1) process in which the level of efficiency in a given country/industry is 
co-integrated with that of the technological frontier country L. This implies that MFP growth in the 
frontier country leads to faster MFP growth in follower countries by widening the production 
                                                      
8 .  The distribution of countries according to the different aspects of collective bargaining and changes over time 
is presented in Elmeskov et al. (1998). 
9 .  Technical change is “Hicks neutral”, or “output augmenting”, when it can be represented as an outward shift of 
the production function that affects all factors of production in the same proportion.   8
possibility set. The leader country is defined as the country with the highest level of MFP. Hence, 
multi-factor productivity for a given industry j of country i can be modelled as follows: 
10  
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where  ω stands for all non-observable factors influencing the level of efficiency. Under the 
assumption of long-run homogeneity for each industry j (1-β1j=β2j+β3j) and rearranging equation [3] 
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where  β2j captures the instantaneous effect of changes in growth of the leader country; (1-β1j) 
indicates, for each industry, the pace of technological transfer; ln(Ai/AL)jt-1 is the technology gap 
between country i and the technology leader and ωijt includes all other influences on technological 
efficiency. In particular, ωijt  can be decomposed into: i) a vector of covariates (Vijt), including 
structural features (e.g. human capital, H; R&D) as well as labor market regulations and institutions 
potentially affecting the level of efficiency; ii) unobserved country and industry effects (fi, g j, 
respectively); iii) world macroeconomic shocks (dt); and iv) a serially uncorrelated error term. (ηijt ):   
∑ + + + + = −
k
ijt t j i kijt k ijt d g f V η γ ω 1                   [ 5 ]  
where Vk includes (H, R&D,  labor market regulations etc.)  
Following Griffith et. al (2000) we also test the hypothesis that R&D and human capital affect 
productivity not only directly, but also indirectly by easing technological adoption. The rationale is 
that both R&D and human capital may be important for technology transfer because they help 
fostering the ability of firms to make the best use of new technologies (i.e. their  absorptive capacity) 
Assuming for simplicity a linear relationship between each of these factors (xs) and the rate of 
technology transfer to non-frontier countries, we can re-write equation [4] as follows 
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where σ1j =(1-β1j).  
                                                      
10   See Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) for more details on this productivity model as well as Griffith et al. (2000) 
and de la Fuente and Doménech (2001) for similar specifications.    9
From equations [4] and [6] it is clear that the coefficient of the technology gap measures the speed of 
(conditional) convergence to the long-run steady state level of technological efficiency. Moreover, in 
the presence of technological convergence, the technological distance between each country/industry 
and the leader converges to a constant value. This implies that the vector of covariates as well as the 
country and industry fixed effects translate only into differences in efficiency levels, and not into 
permanent differences in growth rates of technological efficiency. 
Given the translog production function, the rate of growth of technological efficiency (∆Ln A) can be 
proxied by the so-called Solow residual, or multifactor productivity, as follows: 
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where a bar denotes a geometric average over all the countries for a given industry j and year t and 
( ) 2 / ~
j ijt ijt α α α + =  where αijt is the labor's share in country i  and industry j  and  j α  is the 
cross-country average for industry j.  The MFP index has the desirable properties of transitiveness 
that makes it possible to compare national productivity levels (see Caves et al. 1982). However, the 
comparison of productivity levels also requires the conversion of underlying data into a common 
currency, while also taking into account of differences in purchasing powers across countries. These 
issues are discussed in the next section.     
4.  The empirical analysis 
The data 
Our main source of data is the OECD STAN-2002 database (see the appendix for further details). We 
have also compiled data on occupational skills (employment and wages) and hours worked by sector 
and country from various sources.  
Given data availability, we adopt a value-added measure of MFP. Labor input is based on total hours 
worked using industry-level data, and the capital stock series had to be constructed for a few 
country/industries using the perpetual inventory method (see appendix). The calculation of MFP also 
requires estimates of the partial elasticity of output to labor. Under perfect competition, the partial 
elasticity can be proxied by the share of labor compensation in total costs. The latter, however, is   10
volatile, reflecting short-run fluctuations in demand conditions and possibly the fact that wages are 
not negotiated on an annual basis. In order to minimize these short-run fluctuations, the share of labor 
compensation was regressed on country-industry specific fixed-effects and on the logarithm of 
capital-labor ratio. Fixed effects account for unobserved factors influencing the technology used 
(such as endowments, available technologies, institutional factors). Next, we use as a 
country/sector-specific measure of the labor share the fitted value from this equation, which accounts 
for country-industry fixed components plus variations due to changes in the capital intensity. 
Finally, the calculations of MFP levels requires the use of comparative product price levels across 
countries in order to convert the value of production to common units, while taking into account 
differences in the purchasing power of each country’s currency. Ideally, comparative product prices 
should be measured at the producer level, but survey data on production prices are usually available 
only for a few countries and for even fewer products. Thus, we use estimates of industry-specific 
expenditure PPPs.
11  
Data on R&D intensity are drawn from the OECD ANBERD database. R&D intensity is defined as 
the ratio Business Expenditure in Research and Development (BERD) to value-added. Value-added is 
from the main dataset discussed above. Different measures of human capital were considered. First, 
macro-economic proxy for general human capital, such as the proportion of individual with 
secondary school attainment and the average number of years of schooling of employment were 
considered. The coefficients on either of these two variables turned out to be statistically non 
significant in the MFP regressions. The alternative indicator is an industry-level proxy of human 
capital, based on the skill composition of employment and relative wages by skill level. Thus, the 
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where ωHWh, ωLWh, ωHBl, ωLBl are respectively the wage rate for the white-collar high-skill, white-
collar low-skill, blue-collar high-skill and blue-collar low-skill workers. LHWh,  LHBl and L are 
respectively white-collar high-skill employment, blue-collar high skill employment and total 
employment. Thus, this measure is rising with the wage premium of (white-collar and blue-collar) 
skilled workers relative to unskilled workers, weighted with the proportion of (white-collar and blue-
collar) skilled workers in total employment (see the appendix for a description of the data). 
                                                      
11 .  The alternative is to use aggregate purchasing power parities (PPPs) for GDP as often done in the empirical 
literature (see e.g., Bernard and Jones, 1996a,b). However, aggregate PPPs are problematic if relative prices 
evolve differently across countries (Harrigan, 1997a). For example, Sørensen (2001) shows that while relative 
productivity levels are independent of the choice of the base year, using PPPs for total GDP leads to different 
degree of convergence depending on the base year chosen for PPPs. This may be due to the fact that relative 
prices of manufacturing have evolved differently across countries, but may also reflect the fact that PPPs for 
total GPD have improved over time.      11
In the next step, this variable is regressed on: 1) country specific and industry specific fixed effects; 
and 2) time dummies that are country and industry specific. The predicted value is used as a measure 
of human capital in the MFP regressions reported in the main text.
12  
Given the discussion in the previous section, we consider two main indicators of policy and 
institutions: i) an indicator of hiring and firing costs; and ii) an indicator of the industrial relations 
regime in each country. Hiring and firing costs are proxied by the indicator of the stringency of 
employment protection legislation (EPL). The EPL indicator refers to nation-wide regulations and 
laws and thus does not vary across industries in a given country, even if the related hiring and firing 
costs may well differ depending on specific characteristics of each industry (see Box 1). We have 
also used a measure of EPL that interacts with the size of firms in each industry. Since the average 
size of firms in a given industry is likely to be endogenous to market conditions, including 
institutional factors, we have used the cross-country firm size average for each industry (across a 
sample of ten OECD countries) and applied it to all countries. Industrial relations regimes are 
identified by a summary indicator of corporatism as discussed above.  Moreover, we also test for 
different patterns of productivity growth depending on technology regimes by dividing the industry 
sample into two main groups: low-tech and high tech industries (see Box 1). 
Box 1.  Indicators of Employment Protection, Wage Bargaining and Technological Groups 
The indicators of employment protection legislation (EPL) 
The indicators of employment protection legislation are available for two periods (late 1980s and 1998) and focus on both 
regular and temporary contracts (see Nicoletti et al. 1999). Regulations for regular contracts include: i) procedural 
inconvenience that employers face when trying to dismiss a worker; ii) advance notice of the dismissal and severance 
payments; and iii) prevailing standards of, and penalties for, “unfair” dismissals. Indicators of the stringency of EPL for 
temporary contracts include: i) the “objective” reasons under which they can be offered; ii) the maximum number of 
successive renewals; and iii) the maximum cumulated duration of the contract. The EPL indicator used in the econometric 
analysis is time-varying, with the shift in regime from the late 1980s stance to that of 1990s being defined on the basis of 
information about the timing of major EPL reforms (concerning both temporary and regular workers) in OECD countries.  
It should be stressed that the EPL indicators are constructed on the basis of differences in regulatory settings across 
OECD countries. The focus is on excessive regulation that could unnecessarily restrict market mechanisms, because it 
makes reallocation of resources difficult, hindering the response of the economy to structural changes.  
The indicator of EPL interacting with industry firm size uses the cross-country average size of firms in each industry to 
minimize possible endogeneity of the firm dimension to regulations.  The cross-country average of firm size in each 
industry is calculated using a sample of 9 OECD countries.  For each country, data are from the business register or the 
social security administration and cover all firms with one or more employees. See Bartelsman et al. (2003) for details.   
continued 
                                                      
12 .  The coefficient on human capital remains significant with the same sign if the original variable is used instead 
of the predicted one in the productivity regressions. The use of the original variable, however, reduces 
somewhat the sample size, and thus we decided to concentrate on the predicted human capital variable.   12
Wage bargaining regimes 
The summary indicator of the bargaining system combines two aspects: i) the level of bargaining: centralized, 
intermediate (at sector or regional), or decentralised (firm level); and ii) the degree of co-ordination among, on the one 
hand, employers’ associations and, on the other, trade unions. This combined variable allows consideration of cases 
where co-operation between employers and unions in an industry bargaining setting (e.g., Germany and Austria and, more 
recently, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands with the income policy agreements) may be an alternative, or functionally 
equivalent, to centralized systems, thereby mimicking their outcomes.  The distribution of countries according to the 
different aspects of collective bargaining and changes over time is presented in  Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998).  
The indicator of corporatism is time-varying and consider changes in the predominant level of wage bargaining in the 
OECD countries or in the degree of co-ordination amongst social partners over the period covered in the empirical 
analysis.   
Technological groups 
The industrial organization literature suggests three main elements that characterise market conditions across industries. 
First, differences in market power relate to differences in entry barriers, due to exogenous technological conditions, such 
as economies of scale (see e.g. Panzar, 1989) and scope (Baumol et al., 1982). Second, it has been argued that entry 
barriers may be due to high sunk costs rather than economies of scale. Finally, more recent research has focused on 
horizontal  and  vertical product differentiation  (Eaton and Lipsey, 1989). When consumers cannot rank products 
unambiguously by quality, the taste for variety is valued per se and products can be considered to be differentiated 
horizontally. Products can be considered as differentiated vertically when consumers can rank them by quality.  
In practice, the degree of economies of scale and scope, sunk costs and product differentiation are often combined in 
different ways, but depending on their relative importance, one (or few) will dominate the others, leading to a reduced 
number of market structure prototypes. In practical terms a simple classification can be made based on the returns to 
innovation and the degree of market concentration (see also Sutton, 1998, 2000). If the returns to innovation (e.g. R&D) 
are low, the fraction of revenue devoted to such activity will be low: this configuration indicates low-tech industries 
where production processes and product design are fairly standardised. In this context set-up costs are low and a large 
number of firms compete fiercely on price, which is close to marginal cost. If the returns to innovation are high, firms will 
invest heavily in technologies that improve process and products.  
The nature of competition, the impact of given policy and institutional settings and, ultimately, productivity performance 
may vary across these different market structures. For example, high mark ups could be taken as a sign of market power 
in industries with low R&D, although they may well be an indication of innovation rents in those with high R&D 
(Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 1999).    
Empirical Results 
The empirical analysis covers 17 manufacturing industries in 18 OECD countries
13 over the period 
1984-1998. The technological gap term, representing the distance from the technological frontier, is 
proxied by the difference between the MFP level in a particular industry and the highest level 
amongst countries for that industry. Although crude, this measure broadly confirms expectations 
about which countries and regions tend to be at the forefront of technology in certain fields. For 
example, the estimated levels of MFP (see Appendix Table) reveals that the United States, Canada 
and Japan were often at the frontier (or close to it) in most industries considered in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, especially if the lower levels of hours worked are taken into account, a number of 
European countries were also relatively close to the frontier. The comparison of MFP levels also 
                                                      
13    Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and Western Germany.    13
suggests that in only a few cases does the identity of the frontier remain constant; i.e. in most 
industries, some countries leapfrogged others in terms of technology leadership. As shown below, 
however, what matters for productivity growth is the distance from the technological frontier -- which 
captures the potential for technology transfer -- rather than the identity of the frontier itself.
14  
In order to compare the empirical results with those of previous studies, Table 2 presents different 
specifications of a baseline equation in which MFP growth is regressed only on the industry leader 
and the technology-gap term.
15 The technology-gap term (RTFP) enters negatively and is significant 
at conventional levels in all specifications, suggesting that, within each industry, countries that are 
further behind the frontier experience higher rates of productivity growth (see below for an exception 
in high-tech manufacturing industries). By contrast, we found no evidence of a strong short-run effect 
of the MFP growth in the frontier country (∆ΜFPleader) on other country/industries. The table also 
indicates a positive effect of human capital and R&D activity on productivity growth, as would be 
expected.
16 As discussed above, we also test for a possible interaction between both human capital 
and R&D and the technology gap. The results do not lend a strong support to this idea: in both cases 
the interaction term is not statistically significant at conventional levels, and in the case of R&D is 
even wrongly signed (i.e. R&D seems to lead to divergence, see below). 
The right-hand-side specifications in Table 2 also test for a differentiated impact of technology catch 
up and R&D on productivity depending on the underlying technology level characterizing each 
industry. As discussed in the previous section, industries are divided into a low-tech group (LT in the 
                                                      
14  .  In Scarpetta and Tressel (2002) we run a detailed sensitivity analysis of the baseline MFP equation. In 
particular, we used different measures of MFP (level and growth) based on: i) a measure of labor input that 
does not include hours worked; ii) a measure of labor input that controls for changes in the composition of 
employment by skills; and iii) a measure of the labor share that takes into account the existence of positive 
mark-ups of prices over marginal costs (these are from Oliveira Martins and Scarpetta, 1999). The estimated 
coefficients of the baseline productivity equation are robust to these different measures of MFP.      
15.  All specifications control for country and industry fixed effects. Moreover, all equations include time dummies 
to control for common aggregate shocks that affect MFP in all countries.  Since there is evidence of 
heteroschedasticity in our data, we used the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator of variance. We also excluded 
outliers using a procedure based on the residual and leverage of each observation, based on the notion of the 
influence curve. The influence curve assesses the asymptotic marginal effect of adding a specific observation i 
on the coefficient estimates, on the basis of the original regression model. The influence curve is an asymptotic 
concept. However, the DFITS or Welsch-Kuh distance and the Welsch distance are two indicators used in the 
paper to approximate empirically the influence curve and detect influential observations from it (Chatterjee and 
Hadi, 1988).  We did not use the instrumental variables approach (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991) to correct for  
small-sample downward lagged dependent variable bias because of the difficulty in using lagged observations 
for some of the policy variables and, more importantly, because the bias declines with the number of time 
observations and for t ≈15 the bias is small (see Nickell, 1981). 
16.  This positive association between industry-specific human capital and productivity should not be 
over-emphasized because of possible problems of reverse causality. Strong productivity performance is likely 
to stimulate the accumulation of human capital by firms and attract highly qualified workers. This possible 
reverse causality problem can be particularly serious at the industry or firm level, e.g.  firms/industries with 
high productivity patterns are more likely to invest in highly-skilled workers, by hiring them or recurring to 
internal training.    14
table) and a high-tech group (HT in the table): see the appendix for the industry classification. It is 
noticeable that technology convergence seems to take place mainly in low-tech industry, while in the 
high-tech group of manufacturing industry there is evidence of divergence: i.e. technology leaders 
tend to enjoy higher productivity growth, ceteris paribus, that followers.
17 It is also interesting to 
notice that R&D has a stronger (and statistically significant) effect in high-tech industries than in 
low-tech industries. Moreover, contrary to the overall manufacturing, there is evidence of an 
interaction between R&D and the technology gap in high-tech industries, but the sign is positive, 
suggesting greater returns from R&D of leading countries, compared with followers.
18 High-tech 
industries are often dominated by large, established firms and the presence of barriers for new 
innovators. Returns to R&D in these industries are likely to be larger than in low-tech ones, possibly 
leading to persistent technological leadership. Finally, the results suggest no significant difference in 
the estimated effect of human capital on productivity depending on the underlying technology level.
19   
These results on technology catch up and the impact of R&D activity in high-tech industries may 
offer a rationale for the weaker productivity performance in ICT-related industries in Continental 
Europe compared with the United States and a few small countries (see amongst others Scarpetta et 
al. 2000). The fact that Continental European countries have accumulated a technology gap in ICT-
related industries, instead of leading to stronger productivity growth as standard convergence theory 
would suggest, is further dragging behind these countries compared with the technology leaders. In 
this context, innovation gives a further advantage to the technology leaders. 
In Table 3 the analysis is extended to cover labor market regulations and institutions. Available data 
do not allow differentiating these labor market indicators by industry. In particular, the indicator of 
the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) varies across countries and (for some of 
them) over time, but is identical across industries. The implication of this is that country dummies are 
highly correlated with this country-wide indicator and had to be removed. However, country 
dummies may account for a more diversified set of factors characterizing countries in the sample, 
over and above EPL and their exclusion may lead to an omitted-variable problem.
20 Two tests were 
performed to assess this potential problem. First, we run the standard RESET test of misspecification. 
Second, we test for the sensitivity of the coefficients of the other variables to the elimination of the 
country dummies. In any event, in the specifications without country-fixed effects, standard errors 
                                                      
17 .  The F test rejects the hypothesis of equality of coefficients on the technology gap variable between the two 
technology groups at the 5 per cent level.  
18  .  In this case, the F test rejects the hypothesis of equality of the R&D coefficients and of the interaction 
coefficients (R&D*RTFP) between the two technology groups at the 5 and 1% level, respectively.   
19 .  The F test cannot reject the homogeneity of the coefficients. Moreover, we tested for a possible differentiation 
in the interaction coefficient between human capital and the technology gap: both coefficients were not 
statistically significant and the F-test could not reject the homogeneity of the coefficient. 
20 .  One such factor is the regulatory setting in the product market. However, in another paper we have shown that 
the inclusion of various indicators of the strictness of product market regulation in the productivity equation 
does not alter the sign or statistical significance of the estimated coefficients of EPL. See Scarpetta and Tressel 
(2002).      15
and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators are adjusted for cluster level effects on country-
industry using the procedure suggested by Moulton (1986). 
The results do not lend support to the idea that different industrial relations regimes per se have a 
significant impact on productivity. However, differences in these regimes seem to affect significantly 
the estimated impact of EPL on multifactor productivity. In the first equation in Table 3, the EPL 
coefficient is negatively signed but statistically insignificant. However, if allowed to vary across the 
different industrial relations regimes, the negative impact of strict EPL on productivity becomes 
strong and statistically significant in countries with an intermediate degree of corporatism  --  i.e. 
where sectoral wage bargaining is predominant without co-ordination. This result is consistent with 
the theoretical considerations discussed above. In particular, strict EPL raises the costs of adjusting 
the workforce, and this may have a particularly detrimental effect on technology adoption and MFP 
growth if, in addition, the lack of co-ordination does not offer a firm the required institutional device 
to guarantee a high return on internal training, because other firms can poach on its skilled workforce 
by offering higher wages. 
It should be noticed that removing the country specific effects from the equation weakens the 
productivity equation: the RESET test of mis-specification is significant the 5 percent level and some 
of the estimated coefficients (e.g. human capital) are significantly different from those estimated in 
the baseline specification with country dummies. To test for the robustness of the EPL results to the 
inclusion of country-specific effects, we use the interaction term of EPL and the average (across 
countries) size of firms in each industry. The results largely confirm those based on the simple EPL 
variable: high labor adjustment costs seem to curb productivity in countries with intermediate level of 
bargaining and lacking co-ordination. With this industry-specific indicator, we also test for a possible 
non-linearity in the EPL effect on productivity depending on the average size of firms. This is done 
by also including the interaction variable in level and squared form in the equation. The estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term is negatively signed, as expected, but that on the squared 
interaction variable is positively signed, pointing to the fact that strict EPL has a particular 
detrimental effect in industries with small average firm size.
  We have also tested for a differentiated 
effect of EPL and EPL interacted with average firm size between the two technology regimes.
21 The 
results confirm the negative effect of EPL in intermediate bargaining regimes lacking co-ordination 
and the non-linear effect, but no significant difference in the impact can be detected between the two 
technology regimes.  
The fact that the impact of EPL on productivity also depends on the average size of firms can also be 
rationalized by the fact that in a number of countries with relatively tight EPL (e.g. Germany, Italy, 
Portugal) firms below a given size threshold (ranging from 5 to 25 employees) are exempted from 
certain aspects of the employment protection legislation. More generally, larger units have greater 
scope for internal reorganization to adjust the production process to a new technology than small 
ones. This may also offer an additional explanation for the apparent delay in the adoption of the ICT 
technology in Europe. Recent evidence suggests that new firms tend to be smaller than the average 
                                                      
21   Our results imply that the impact of EPL is negative for firms with less than 400 employees.   16
incumbent in most industries, and play an important role in the adoption of ICT (see Scarpetta et al, 
2002): high labor adjustment costs may deter entry of such highly innovative firms and thus slow 
down the adoption of the ICT technology.  
5. Concluding  remarks 
In this paper, we present an empirical investigation of the drivers of industry-level multifactor 
productivity growth for a set of manufacturing industries in 18 OECD economies. We focus on 
traditional growth factors, including technological catch up, human capital and R&D as well as 
institutional factors affecting labor costs.  
The results for the whole manufacturing sector are consistent with the standard convergence 
hypothesis, whereby countries that are further behind the technological frontier tend to experience 
higher rates of productivity growth, other things being equal. However, allowing for differences in 
the process of technological catch up across industries indicates a cross-country divergence in 
high-tech industries where, ceteris paribus, country leaders tend to pull ahead of the others. 
Moreover, while there is evidence of a positive and significant impact of human capital on 
productivity growth in all industries, the link between R&D activity and productivity is strongly 
influenced by the level and type of technology dominating in each industry.  Thus, there is no 
evidence of R&D boosting productivity in low-tech industries, but the effect is strong in high-tech 
industries. In the latter, there is also a strong positive interaction between R&D and the technology 
gap, i.e. there are greater returns to R&D in the leading countries, compared with followers. This is 
consistent with high appropriability conditions in many high-tech industries in which knowledge and 
technological progress is strongly cumulative, which gives the technological leader an advantage in 
the introduction of innovations.  
Depending on the industrial relation regime, labor adjustment costs also contribute to explain 
cross-country differences in industry productivity patterns. High adjustment costs (proxied by the 
strictness of employment protection legislation) have a strong negative impact on productivity in 
countries lacking coordination among employers. This is consistent with the view that firms may 
adopt different strategies to accommodate the workforce to the requirements of new technologies. 
Firms facing high hiring and firing costs will make greater use of the internal labor market (training) 
rather than hiring new workers, especially if wage dispersion across skills is limited as in centralized 
and sectoral wage bargaining systems. However, the expected returns from training will tend to be 
low if industrial relations do not offer an institutional device (such as coordination among employers) 
that limits free-riding behavior associated with the possibility for other firms to poach on the pool of 
trained workers. In these cases, high hiring and firing costs lead to sub-optimal adjustments of the 
workforce to technology changes and lower incentives for firms to innovate or adopt new 
technologies with negative effects on productivity performance.   
These results may have important implications for developing countries. They clearly point to the fact 
that productivity convergence cannot be taken for granted, especially in high tech industries, and 
likely depends on whether the business environment creates appropriate conditions for firms to take   17
advantage of new technologies available in the world market. Such conditions include the ability to 
adapt the workforce to the needs of these new technologies, which in turn depends on industrial 
relations regimes and labor market regulations. The lack of relative wage flexibility together with 
high firing costs, as observed in several developing countries, may significantly deter firms from 
innovating or even adopting new technologies, and thus slow down the technological and economic 
catch-up process.           18
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Table 1. Decomposition of growth performance, 1980-2000
Percentage change at annual rate, trend series
Summary of business sector GDP growth and its components

















U n i t e d  S t a t e s 3 . 33 . 64 . 12 . 02 . 22 . 51 . 31 . 41 . 62 . 92 . 53 . 00 . 91 . 11 . 3
Japan 4.1 1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.6 -0.9 3.3 2.3 1.9 6.5 5.1 4.3 2.2 1.0 0.7
Germany 2.3 1.8 2.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 2.5 1.9 1.6 3.7 3.2 3.0 1.5 0.9 0.8
F r a n c e 2 . 32 . 12 . 6- 0 . 90 . 10 . 83 . 22 . 01 . 84 . 03 . 12 . 71 . 91 . 01 . 1
Italy 2.5 1.9 2.1 0.1 -0.1 0.5 2.4 2.0 1.6 3.2 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 0.7
U n i t e d  K i n g d o m 3 . 12 . 02 . 60 . 70 . 71 . 22 . 31 . 41 . 52 . 82 . 82 . 81 . 00 . 71 . 0
C a n a d a 2 . 73 . 14 . 01 . 51 . 62 . 41 . 21 . 51 . 63 . 51 . 40 . 90 . 61 . 31 . 7
A u s t r a l i a 3 . 54 . 14 . 52 . 12 . 02 . 21 . 42 . 12 . 24 . 44 . 14 . 50 . 61 . 31 . 4
Austria 2.4 2.7 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 2.7 2.6 2.7 4.4 4.4 4.3 1.8 1.6 1.5
B e l g i u m 2 . 62 . 12 . 20 . 0- 0 . 10 . 12 . 62 . 32 . 23 . 43 . 83 . 81 . 71 . 21 . 2
Denmark 2.2 2.6 3.1 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.9 2.3 2.1 3.8 2.5 2.4 1.0 1.5 1.4
Finland 2.6 2.9 4.9 -1.0 -0.7 1.5 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.2 0.8 0.7 2.4 3.2 3.6
G r e e c e 0 . 72 . 12 . 80 . 20 . 70 . 80 . 61 . 42 . 00 . 42 . 23 . 50 . 60 . 80 . 9
Ireland 4.4 7.4 8.7 0.1 2.8 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.4 2.7 3.3 .. 3.6 4.4 ..
N e t h e r l a n d s 2 . 23 . 13 . 4- 1 . 10 . 91 . 73 . 32 . 11 . 63 . 63 . 43 . 52 . 31 . 61 . 2
N e w  Z e a l a n d 1 . 32 . 93 . 3- 0 . 12 . 12 . 31 . 40 . 70 . 93 . 12 . 22 . 50 . 20 . 80 . 9
Norway 1.4 2.5 2.9 -0.5 0.2 1.0 1.9 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.9 1.2 1.7 1.3
Portugal 3.7 2.1 .. 0.7 -0.4 .. 3.0 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
S p a i n 2 . 42 . 93 . 5- 1 . 01 . 12 . 43 . 51 . 81 . 14 . 44 . 23 . 92 . 10 . 70 . 5
Sweden 2.1 2.4 3.4 0.5 0.2 1.5 1.6 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.5 .. 1.0 1.4 ..
Switzerland 1.7 0.5 .. .. 0.1 0.1 .. 0.3 .. .. 2.7 .. .. .. ..
Korea 9.2 6.1 4.1 2.0 1.0 0.3 7.0 5.0 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Weighted average:
EU15
7 2.5 2.2 2.6 -0.2 0.3 0.9 2.7 1.9 1.6 3.4 3.1 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.9
OECD24
8 3 . 12 . 73 . 00 . 91 . 01 . 32 . 11 . 71 . 73 . 73 . 13 . 11 . 31 . 11 . 1
Standard deviation:
EU15
7 0.84 1.40 1.77 0.64 0.85 1.09 0.93 0.84 0.89 1.09 1.01 0.96 0.77 1.07 0.82
OECD24
8 0.91 1.31 1.59 0.92 0.99 1.15 0.99 0.89 0.79 1.21 1.08 1.06 0.81 0.90 0.68
1. 1983-1990 for Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, 1985-1990 for Austria and New Zealand, 1986-1990 for Portugal.
2. 1991-1996 for Switzerland, 1990-1997 for Austria, Belgium, New Zealand, 1990-1998 for Ireland, Korea and Netherlands, 1990-1999 for Denmark, Greece,Japan and United Kingdom.
3. 1996-1997 for Austria, Belgium, New Zealand, 1996-1998 for Ireland, Korea and Netherlands, 1996-1999 for Denmark, Greece,Japan and United Kingdom.
4. 1983-1990 for Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, 1985-1990 for Austria and New Zealand, 1987-1990 for United Kingdom.
5. 1991-1996 for Switzerland, 1990-1996 for Ireland and Sweden, 1990-1997 for Austria, Belgium, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 1990-1998 for Netherlands, 1990-1999 for Australia, 
    Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Japan.
6. 1996-1997 for Austria, Belgium, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 1996-1998 for Netherlands, 1996-1999 for Australia, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy and Japan.
7. Excluding Luxembourg.
8. Excluding Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey.    23
 
 
Table 2.  MFP regressions: selection of the baseline specification
A
1 BCD E F G H
Constant _cons -2.978   -2.976 * -2.976 ** -18.155 *** -15.904 *** -19.645 *** -20.807 *** -20.198 ***
(2.998) (1.676) (1.281) (5.874) (5.945) (5.872) (5.929) (5.993)
∆ TFPLeader j t Da2ijt -0.020 * -0.007   -0.007   -0.012   -0.012  
(0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
∆ TFPLeader j t (HT) HiTec -0.010   -0.009   -0.009  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
∆ TFPLeader j t (LT) LoTec -0.037   -0.038   -0.038  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
RTFPi j t-1 cInde -0.060 *** -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.029 *** -0.034 *
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020)
RTFPi j t-1 (HT) HiTec -0.019 *** 0.005   0.005  
(0.006) (0.015) (0.015)
RTFPi j t-1 (LT) LoTec -0.038 *** -0.051 *** -0.051 ***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.016)
R&Di j t-1  Lnber 0.006 *** 0.009 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
R&Di j t-1 (HT) HiTec 0.013 ** 0.013 *
(0.007) (0.007)
R&Di j t-1 (LT) LoTec 0.004   0.004  
(0.003) (0.003)
(R&D * RTFP)i j t-1(HT)  HiTec 0.0001 * 0.0001 *
(0.0001) (0.0001)
(R&D * RTFP)i j t-1(LT)  LoTec -0.00003   -0.00003  
(0.00003) (0.00003)
Human capital i j t-1 (HT) HiTec 0.390 ***
(0.115)
Human capital i j t-1 (LT) LoTec 0.352 ***
(0.116)
Human capital i j t-1 PLHu 0.344 *** 0.316 *** 0.359 *** 0.364 ***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.115) (0.114)
(Human capital * RTFP) i j t-1 PLHu -0.00035  
(0.00037)
RESET RESE 76.67 *** 0.79   0.79   0.57  1.09  0.82  0.63  0.92  
Heteroskedasticity
2 hetes 1205.55 ***        
Industry dummies Indus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Coun Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Year d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations Obse 2625 2569 2569 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022
* : significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.  Reset is the Sargan test for missspecification.
1. Full sample, no control for heteroskedasticity.
2. Cook Weisberg test of heteroskedasticity.
Robust standard errors (from eq.B) in parentheses.
Samples are adjusted for outliers from equation C onwards. See main text.  24
  Table 3. MFP regressions: the role of labour market institutions
AB CD E
Constant _con -0.546   0.767   -23.106 *** -26.659 *** -25.387 ***
(1.876) (2.100) (6.231) (6.314) (6.588)
∆ TFPLeader j t Da2ij -0.012   -0.011   -0.012  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ TFPLeader j t (HT) HiTec -0.009   -0.008  
(0.008) (0.009)
∆ TFPLeader j t (LT) LoTe -0.039   -0.039  
(0.036) (0.036)
RTFPi j t-1 cInde -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.028 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
RTFPi j t-1 (HT) HiTec 0.005   0.044  
(0.015) (0.033)
RTFPi j t-1 (LT) LoTe -0.054 *** -0.045 *
(0.017) (0.028)
R&Di j t-1  Lnbe 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.005 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R&Di j t-1 (HT) HiTec 0.011 * 0.012 *
(0.007) (0.007)
R&Di j t-1 (LT) LoTe 0.003   0.003  
(0.003) (0.003)
(R&D * RTFP)i j t-1(HT)  HiTec 0.0001 * 0.0001 *
(0.0001) (0.0001)
(R&D * RTFP)i j t-1(LT)  LoTe -0.00004   -0.00004  
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Human capital i j t-1 PLHu 0.005   -0.016   0.430 *** 0.464 ***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.122) (0.122)
Human capital i j t-1 (HT) HiTec 0.401 ***
(0.131)
Human capital i j t-1 (LT) LoTe 0.435 ***
(0.128)
(Human capital * RTFP) i j t-1(HT) HiTec -0.001  
(0.001)
(Human capital * RTFP) i j t-1(LT) LoTe -0.0002  
(0.0005)
High corporatism Hcor -0.420  
(0.443)
Low corporatism Lcor -0.161  
(0.494)
EPL epl -0.095  
(0.147)
EPL (high corporatism) eplHc 0.625  
(0.502)
EPL (high corporatism)*sizej eplHc 1.785   1.405   1.581  
(1.267) (1.271) (1.290)
EPL (high corporatism)*sizej
2 eplH- -0.004   -0.004   -0.004  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
EPL (medium corporatism) eplM -1.151 ***
(0.277)
EPL (medium corporatism)*sizej eplM -2.501 *** -2.501 *** -2.501 ***
(0.600) (0.613) (0.620)
EPL (medium corporatism)*sizej
2 eplM 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EPL (low corporatism) eplLc 0.095  
(0.201)
EPL (low corporatism)*sizej eplLc 0.174   0.174   0.174  
(0.506) (0.512) (0.517)
EPL (low corporatism)*sizej
2 eplL- -0.001   -0.001   -0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RESET RESE 2.16 * 2.93 ** 0.44  0.40  0.58  
Industry dummies Indus Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Coun No Yes No Yes Yes
Year dummies Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations Obse 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022
* : significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level.  Reset is the Sargan test for missspecification.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Samples are adjusted for outliers. See main text.




Chart 1. Labour productivity growth in manufacturing and its break down by technology groups, 1990-98
1. Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel, rubber and plastics products, other non-metallic mineral products,
    basic metals and fabricated metal products, bulding and repairing of ships and boats and manufacturing n.e.c, food products,
    beverages and tobacco, textiles, textiles products, leather and footwear, wood and products of wood and cork, pulp, paper, 
    paper products, printing and publishing, furniture.
2. Pharmaceuticals, office, accounting and computing machinery, radio, television and communication equipment, aircraft and 
    spacecraft, chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, n.e.c, electrical machinery 
    and apparatus, n.e.c, medical, precision and optical instruments, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, railroad equipment
    and transport equipment n.e.c.
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Chart 2. Industrial relations regimes, employment protection and the acceleration in MFP 
growth, 1980-2000 
 
Panel A: Acceleration in MFP growth and industrial relations regimes
Panel B: Acceleration in MFP growth and employment protection legislation
1.  The indicator of corporatism combines two aspects: i) the level of bargaining: centralized,
intermediate (at sector or regional), or decentralized (firm level); and ii) the degree of coordination
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Appendix: Data sources 
 
Source of the different data 
 Data  on  hours worked are from ILO for the following countries: Australia, Austria, 
Finland, France, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy, Japan Netherlands and New Zealand. For 
manufacturing industries, we use the data for total manufacturing. For the sectors 41 and 42 (see 
Table below), we have data for: Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy 
and Netherlands. For Norway, Japan and New Zealand we use data of industry 40. For sectors 44, 
45, we use data of sector 43 for all countries. For sectors 47 and 51, we have the data for: 
Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Italy and Netherlands. We use data 
of sector 46 for Norway and New Zealand. For the United States, we use the data from the BLS. 
Data are from CRONOS for the following countries: Belgium, Denmark and Germany. For 
Canada, we use data from the National Statistics Office. 
  Wage data are country-industry specific observations. They are from the OECD-DELSA 
database on employment. The primary source of the data is the European Structure of Earnings 
Survey (Eurostat) for EU countries, OECD calculations on the microdata file of the outgoing 
rotation group of the Current Population Survey for the US, and Structure of Earnings Surveys or 
Labour Force Surveys for the other countries. The observation is 1998 for non-EU countries, 1994 
for France, 1996 for Sweden, 1995 for other EU countries. Data on wages for Portugal, 
Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Germany, Australia and Japan are not included. In order not to 
drop these countries when using skill data, we make the following assumption: we use the relative 
wages of a neighbour country when available, or the US data otherwise. For Portugal, we use 
Spain, for Netherlands we use Belgium, for Finland and Norway we use Sweden; for Germany we 
use Austria; for Canada, Australia and Japan we use the US. 
  Data on the skill composition of employment also have a country, industry and time 
dimension.
22 These data are from several sources: (1) the OECD-DELSA data described above, 
(2) the skill data in OECD STI Working Paper No. 1998/4; and (3) ILO data on aggregate 
employment for the four skill categories. Data from (2) typically have country, industry and time 
dimension,
23 while those from (3) are panel data at the country level. Our dataset was constructed 
in the following way: we used (2) as the baseline source; then we complemented these data using 
(1) and (3) for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The procedure was the following: when the industry 
breakdown was available in (1), we used this single observation to compute, for each skill 
category, the industry wage relative to the country (weighted) average wage, and used this 
differential to construct time series from the aggregate source (3) data.  
We used industry-specific PPPs to convert volume output into a comparable currency (se 
Sørensen, 2001, for a critics of the use of nation-wide GDP PPPs for the comparison of 
                                                      
22   Except for Canada for which we do not have the manufacturing detail and Norway data do not have the 
sectoral decomposition. 
23   Depending on the country considered, the number of (non consecutive) observation varies between 2 and 5. 
We use a linear extrapolation between the two extreme points to obtain a panel dataset.   28
productivity levels, as in Bernard and Jones, 1986a,b). The starting point of these calculations was 
the PPPs for detailed expenditure headings from the United Nations International Comparisons 
Project (ICP). These detailed PPPs were mapped into the STAN classification of industries by 
assigning each basic expenditure heading bought by consumers, firms or the government to its 
industry of origin. When the basic heading includes products produced in more than one industry, 
the same price was assigned to all the industries concerned. Within each industry, proxies of the 
product prices were obtained aggregating the basic headings with the corresponding expenditure 
shares. However, as suggested by Harrigan (1997), there are a number of problems in using 
expenditure PPPs for industry productivity comparison. In particular the presence of distribution 
and transportation margins, indirect taxes and the inclusion/exclusion of the prices of 
imported/exported goods all tend to create a gap between expenditure prices and production 
prices. While available data did not allow accounting for distribution and transportation margins, 
corrections for both indirect taxes and international trade were made. In particular, in the above-
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where ti,j is the indirect tax rate of country i in industry j.  
  The impact of trade on the differential between expenditure and production prices is 
larger the more the sectoral expenditure price differs from the exchange rate. Since imports and 
exports have opposite effects on this differential, only the net trade position is relevant. The 
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where X stands for industry exports, M for industry imports, Y for industry output, and e for the 
exchange rate. 
  As a final test of robustness, the whole analysis (e.g. for the different measures of labor 
input) was repeated by using aggregate PPPs for GDP from STD, National Accounts of OECD 
Countries – Main Aggregates. Vol. I – 2002 Edition. 
  In a number of instances, the industry time series of the capital stock was not readily 
available in the original databases. If data on gross fixed capital formation were available, we 
used the perpetual inventory method to construct a proxy for the capital stock following the 
OECD ISDB User Guide:  
∑ − −
−
= ⋅ = j t j t
ASL
j t g INV GCS
5 2
0                       
where:  GCS is the gross capital stock at constant prices, INV is gross fixed capital formation at 
constant prices; g is the survival coefficient; j is the vintage of investment; ASL is the average 
service life. The survival coefficient is given by: g = 1 if j<5 and g = 1- ½(ASL-5) if j>4 and j-
1<2ASL-5 (depreciation starts at date t-5). Average services lives (ASL) are from ISDB98 – 
methods used by OECD countries to measure stocks of fixed capital, OECD, Paris (1993).    29
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Gross capital stocks are calculated from this formula. 
 
The indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is from Nicoletti, 
Scarpetta and Boylaud.  1999. Regulations for regular contracts include: i) procedural 
inconveniences that employers face when trying to dismiss a worker; ii) advance notice of the 
dismissal and severance payments; and iii) prevailing standards of, and penalties for, “unfair” 
dismissals. Indicators of the stringency of EPL for temporary contracts include: i) the “objective” 
reasons under which they can be offered; ii) the maximum number of successive renewals; iii) and 
the maximum cumulated duration of the contract.  
The summary indicator of the bargaining system combines two aspects: the level of bargaining, 
being centralised, intermediate (at sector or regional), or decentralised (firm level); and the degree 
of coordination amongst employers. This combined variable allows considering cases where 
co-operation between employers and unions in an industry bargaining setting (e.g., Germany and 
Austria and, more recently, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands with the income policy agreements) 
may be an alternative, or functionally equivalent, to centralised systems, thereby mimicking their 
outcomes. The distribution of countries according to the different aspects of collective bargaining 
and changes over time is presented in Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998).  
Finally, data on average firm size for different manufacturing industries are from the OECD 
firm-level database that includes data for ten OECD countries based on harmonized definitions 
(see Bartelsman et al. 2003).      30
Appendix Table   Industries considered in the empirical analysis by technology groups
Description ISIC Rev.3 Technology group
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 15-16 Low Tech
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 17-19 Low Tech
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 20 Low Tech
PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 21-22 Low Tech
….COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 23 Low Tech
……..CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS 24ex2423 High Tech
……..PHARMACEUTICALS  2423 High Tech
….RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS 25 Low Tech
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 26 Low Tech
….BASIC METALS 27 Low Tech
….FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, except machinery and equipment 28 Low TEch
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT nec. 29 High Tech
….ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT 30-33 High Tech
….MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 34 High Tech
……..BUILDING AND REPAIRING OF SHIPS AND BOATS 351 Low Tech
……..AIRCRAFT AND SPACECRAFT 353 High Tech
……..RAILROAD EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT N.E.C. 352+359 High Tech




Appendix Table  Relative MFP levels and the technology leaders, 1984, 1997








Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Food products, beverages and tobacco  1
st USA CAN 0.69 0.17 USA CAN 0.69 0.14
2
d JPN USA JPN USA
3
d CAN JPN CAN JPN
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear  1
st FRA CAN 0.71 0.15 FRA CAN 0.75 0.15
2
d CAN FRA CAN FRA
3
d AUS USA AUT ITA
Wood and products of wood and cork  1
st USA USA 0.60 0.23 CAN USA 0.59 0.21
2
d CAN FIN USA FIN
3
d GRC ITA GRC NOR
Pulp paper, paper products, printing and publishing  1
st CAN CAN 0.70 0.15 CAN FRA 0.74 0.13
2
d USA FRA FRA CAN
3
d F R AF I N U S AI T A
                  Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  1
st ITA ITA 0.38 0.24 ITA ITA 0.38 0.24
2
d FRA USA FRA FIN
3
d USA FIN KOR USA
                  Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals  1
st FIN FIN 0.50 0.26 FIN FIN 0.50 0.26
2
d BEL FRA BEL FRA
3
d CAN CAN GER CAN
                  Pharmaceuticals  1
st JPN CAN 0.60 0.39 JPN CAN 0.65 0.40
2
d USA NOR USA NOR
3
d CAN GBR NOR GER
                  Rubber and plastics products  1
st AUT USA 0.64 0.14 AUT ITA 0.69 0.13
2
d ESP ITA DNK FIN
3
d NLD FIN ESP USA
Other non-metallic mineral products  1
st CAN CAN 0.71 0.15 CAN CAN 0.76 0.15
2
d BEL FRA AUT FRA
3
d GER USA BEL USA
                  Basic metals  1
st JPN JPN 0.71 0.18 NLD FIN 0.72 0.17
2
d NLD FIN DNK JPN
3
d USA CAN JPN NOR
                  Fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment  1
st CAN USA 0.71 0.17 CAN USA 0.76 0.17
2
d USA FIN BEL FIN
3
d BEL JPN GER JPN
                  Machinery and equipment n.e.c.  1
st CAN FRA 0.70 0.20 CAN FRA 0.77 0.12
2
d G E RF I N G E RF I N
3
d JPN ITA DNK ITA
                  Electrical and optical equipment  1
st AUS FIN 0.62 0.25 AUS FIN 0.70 0.21
2
d JPN JPN DNK JPN
3
d ITA FRA JPN FRA
                  Motor vehicles trailers and semi-trailers  1
st USA USA 0.64 0.21 USA USA 0.82 0.13
2
d GRC FRA GRC FRA
3
d CAN FIN CAN FIN
                  Building and repairing of ships and boats  1
st FRA USA 0.63 0.24 FRA CAN 0.76 0.21
2
d USA JPN USA GER
3
d JPN CAN ITA NOR
                  Aircraft and spacecraft  1
st FRA CAN 0.47 0.31 FRA CAN 0.47 0.30
2
d CAN NLD CAN GER
3
d NLD GER GER NLD
                  Railroad equipment and transport equipment n.e.c.  1
st CAN CAN 0.47 0.28 ITA CAN 0.56 0.24
2
d ITA FIN CAN FIN
3
d FRA JPN FRA GBR
Manufacturing n.e.c; recycling  1
st CAN USA 0.84 0.17 CAN FRA 0.83 0.15
2
d USA FRA USA USA
3
d F I NF I N F I NF I N
Note: Data for Germany refer to western Germany.
1. If 1997 data were not available, basic statistics refer to the most recent year with sufficiently large country coverage.
1984 1997 1984 1997